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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Chad Lee Williams appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty pleas to possession of methamphetamine and resisting or 
obstructing officers.  On appeal, Williams challenges the denial of his motion to 
suppress. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 On July 3, 2014, the Boise City Police Department assembled a team of 
officers to execute a felony arrest warrant for Cody Bellenbrock.  (Tr., p.6, L.19 – 
p.14, L.2, p.22, Ls.4-13; State’s Exhibit 1.)  The police had received information 
that Bellenbrock was staying at an apartment on Wiley Lane in Ada County.  (Tr., 
p.8, Ls.11-24.)   At approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer Ryan Thueson and another 
officer began surveilling the apartment “to see if it looked like anybody was 
home.”  (Tr., p.9, L.8 – p.11, L.2.)  The officers determined the apartment was 
occupied and they called for assistance from other units before they attempted to 
contact anybody in the residence.  (Tr., p.9, Ls.16-21.) 
 Approximately a half hour after he began watching the front of the 
residence, Officer Thueson saw four individuals, one of whom was later 
identified as Williams, exit the apartment.  (Tr., p.14, L.11 – p.15, L.11, p.31, 
L.17 – p.32, 19.)  A “minute or two” later, Officer Thueson and two other officers 
approached the front of the apartment.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.3-23, p.14, L.23 – p.15, 
L.11, p.22, Ls.4-11.)  As he approached, Officer Thueson could see the four 
individuals who had exited the apartment “standing right in front of the door.”  
 
 2 
(Tr., p.11, L.21 – p.12, L.1.)  Officer Thueson shined his flashlight on one of the 
individuals, whom he correctly believed was Bellenbrock.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.13-18.)  
Immediately upon seeing the officer, Bellenbrock fled into the residence and then 
out the back door.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.16-22.)  Officer Thueson pursued Bellenbrock 
and, with the assistance of another officer, took him into custody.  (Tr., p.12, L.22 
– p.13, L.23.)  The entire encounter between Officer Thueson and Bellenbrock – 
from the time Officer Thueson ran after Bellenbrock to the time the officer took 
Bellenbrock into custody and then returned to the front of the apartment – took, 
at the most, “[t]hree or four minutes.”  (Tr., p.13, L.24 – p.14, L.2, p.15, Ls.12-19, 
p.16, L.23 – p.17, L.9.) 
 After Bellenbrock was in custody, Officer Thueson returned to the front of 
the apartment where two other officers were attempting to identify the three other 
individuals who were standing outside of the front door.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.3-10, p.15, 
L.24 – p.16, L.12.)  As soon as Officer Thueson re-approached the front of the 
apartment he smelled a strong odor of fresh marijuana emanating from the 
residence.  (Tr., p.16, Ls.13-16, p.27, L.25 – p.28, L.7, p.29, L.21 – p.30, L.10.)  
He spoke to the “homeowner,” who was one of the individuals standing outside 
the apartment door, and she admitted there was marijuana and paraphernalia in 
the apartment.  (Tr., p.16, Ls.17-22, p.17, Ls.10-17, p.32, Ls.6-19.)  Based on 
“the clear, discernible odor of marijuana coming from the residence,” the 
homeowner’s admission that “there was indeed marijuana in the residence,” and 
the officer’s “knowledge that Mr. Williams had been in the residence for at least 
close to 30 minutes,” Officer Thueson decided to arrest Williams and Roger 
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Jones – the other individual who was standing outside the door of the apartment 
– for frequenting.  (Tr., p.17, L.21 – p.18, L.11.) 
 Officer Thueson handcuffed Jones, searched him incident to arrest, and 
found marijuana in his pockets.  (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-9.)  Another officer handcuffed 
Williams and attempted to hand him over to Officer Thueson to be searched, but 
Williams ran away.  (Tr., p.18, Ls.12-21, p.19, Ls.9-17.)  Officer Thueson caught 
up to Williams and tackled him.  (Tr., p.19, Ls.18-24.)  Williams “continued to 
fight even after he was tackled,” but Officer Thueson was eventually able to 
search him incident to arrest.  (Tr., p.20, Ls.6-10.)  During the search, the officer 
found in Williams’ pants pocket “a bag of methamphetamine, a bag of marijuana, 
a methamphetamine pipe, a marijuana pipe and a digital scale with marijuana 
residue on it.”  (Tr., p.20, Ls.11-15.) 
 The state charged Williams with possession of methamphetamine, 
possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, frequenting a place 
where controlled substances are known to be located, and resisting or 
obstructing officers.  (R., pp.58-60.)  Williams moved to suppress the evidence 
against him, arguing it was the fruit of an unlawful detention and arrest.  (R., 
pp.73-98; see also Tr., p.35, L.16 – p.38, L.3, p.39, L.22 – p.41, L.5.)  After a 
hearing, the district court denied Williams’ motion, ruling Williams’ initial 
detention and subsequent arrest were both constitutionally reasonable.  (R., 
pp.99-100; Tr., p.41, L.10 – p.45, L.7.) 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement in which Williams reserved the right to 
challenge the denial of his suppression motion on appeal, Williams pled guilty to 
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possession of methamphetamine and resisting or obstructing officers, and the 
state dismissed the remaining charges.  (R., pp.101-12.)  The district court 
imposed an aggregate unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed.  








Williams states the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Williams’ motion 
to suppress because the officers detained Mr. Williams for longer 
than necessary and then arrested him without probable cause? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.6) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 







Williams Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
 
A. Introduction 
 Williams challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that 
officers “detained [him] for longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the detention and then arrested [him] for frequenting without probable cause.”1  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-14.)  Williams’ arguments fail.  Correct application of the 
law to the facts supports the district court’s determinations that Williams’ 
detention and his subsequent arrest for frequenting were both constitutionally 
reasonable.  Even assuming the arrest was unlawful, suppression is not 
warranted.  By running from officers after he was placed in custody, Williams 
committed a new and independent crime that justified both his arrest and the 
search that followed.  The district court’s order denying Williams’ motion to 
suppress should be affirmed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the 
                                            
1 Williams acknowledges his trial counsel conceded below that officers could 
detain him to determine whether he harbored a fugitive and, as such, “he cannot 
challenge the legality of his initial detention on appeal.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.8 
(citing Tr., p.37, Ls.17-21).)  He argues, however, that the detention was 
unreasonably prolonged beyond any justifiable purpose.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-
13.)  Williams’ trial counsel did not expressly challenge the length of the initial 
detention at the hearing on Williams’ motion to suppress.  (See generally Tr.)  
However, because Williams’ trial counsel addressed the issue in his written 
briefing filed in support of the motion to suppress (see R., pp.82-83), the state 
assumes the issue was sufficiently preserved for appeal.  
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trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the 
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found.”  State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Williams’ Initial Detention 
Was Constitutionally Reasonable 
 
 1. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In 
 Concluding That Williams’ Initial Detention Was A Constitutionally 
 Reasonable Measure Taken To Secure The Scene And Ensure 
 The Safety Of The Officers Executing An Arrest Warrant 
 
Seizures of the person are evaluated under a Fourth Amendment 
standard of reasonableness.  Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697-700 
(1981).  Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must 
be supported by probable cause.  Id. at 700; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 
200, 208 (1979).  There are, however, certain exceptions to the probable cause 
requirement.  For example, it is well settled that a police officer may, in 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an 
individual if that officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is 
underway.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).  Additionally, “[i]n the 
execution of a search warrant for drugs or contraband at a residence, it is lawful 
for police to detain, during the duration of the search, those individuals who are 
occupants of the residence.”  State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911, 914, 155 P.3d 
712, 715 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 705; State v. Kester, 137 
Idaho 643, 646, 51 P.3d 457, 460 (Ct. App. 2002)).  “Similarly, individuals found 
on the premises at the inception of the search whose identity and connection to 
the premises are unknown may be detained for the time necessary to determine 
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those facts and to protect the safety of those present during the detention.”  
Reynolds, 143 Idaho at 914, 155 P.3d at 715 (citing Kester, 137 Idaho at 646, 51 
P.3d at 460; State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296, 300, 47 P.3d 1266, 1270 (Ct. App. 
2002)).     
Relying on Reynolds, the district court ruled officers were justified in 
temporarily detaining Williams while they executed the arrest warrant for 
Bellenbrock.  (Tr., p.42, L.10 – p.43, L.5.)  The court reasoned: 
[I]ndividuals who are found on the premises at the inception of a 
search and whose identity and connection to the premises are 
unknown may be detained for the time necessary to determine 
those facts and to protect the safety of those present during the 
detention.  That’s State versus Reynolds at 143 Idaho 911.  It’s a 
Court of Appeals 2007 case. 
 
 And so individuals found at the scene where there is a 
legitimate – for example, the execution of a search warrant or in 
this case an arrest warrant can be detained for a time necessary to 
determine who they are and to protect the safety of those present 
during the detention. 
 
 In this particular case they were executing an arrest warrant 
and in response to that, Mr. Bellenbrock … had actually ran [sic] for 
a period of time.  So there’s nothing unreasonable about the 
temporary detention. 
 
(Tr., p.42, L.10 – p.43, L.5.) 
 
 Williams challenges the district court’s ruling, arguing the exception to the 
probable cause requirement articulated in “Reynolds and its predecessors, 
including Michigan v. Summers …, only allow[s] law enforcement to detain 
occupants of premises subject to a search warrant.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.9 
(emphasis in original).)  According to Williams, the justifications that permit 
officers to detain persons at the scene of the execution of a search warrant are 
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not present in cases such as this one, where officers are executing an arrest 
warrant.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-11.) Because, according to Williams, 
“Bellenbrock’s arrest warrant could not justify detaining Mr. Williams in the first 
place, it similarly cannot justify prolonging the length of Mr. Williams’ detention.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.10.)   Williams’ argument is unpersuasive because it draws a 
distinction without a difference and ignores the standard by which all seizures 
are to be judged under the Fourth Amendment, i.e. “the ultimate standard of 
reasonableness.”  Summers, 452 U.S. at 699-700. 
In evaluating the reasonableness of any seizure, the court must “balance 
the extent of the intrusion against the government interests justifying it, looking in 
the final and dispositive portion of the analysis to the individualized and objective 
facts that made those interests applicable in the circumstances of the particular 
detention.”  People v. Glaser, 902 P.2d 729, 734 (Cal. 1995) (citing Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21; Summers, 452 U.S. at 703); accord State v. Thurman, 134 Idaho 90, 
95, 996 P.2d 309, 314 (Ct. App. 1999).  Although Summers involved the 
detention of individuals during the execution of a search warrant for contraband, 
neither that case or any Idaho case decided after it, including Reynolds, require 
the existence of a search warrant for contraband as a prerequisite to finding the 
detention of an individual to be reasonable.  Rather,  the existence of a search 
warrant “is but one factor the courts consider when determining the 
governmental interest involved.”  People v. Hannah, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 806, 810 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996).  Other factors to be considered include “the interest in 
minimizing the risk of harm to the officers” and the facilitation of “the orderly 
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completion” of the officers’ task.  Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03.  Just as “the 
execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may 
give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence,” Id., 
the execution of an arrest warrant at a residence occupied by several individuals 
likewise raises concerns for officer safety.  See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 
333 (1990) (acknowledging risks of danger associated with in-home arrests, 
including presence of other potentially dangerous individuals).  In such 
situations, “[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if 
the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.”  
Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03 (citation omitted). 
In recognition of the foregoing principles, many courts that have 
considered the issue have “concluded that officers entering a residence to 
execute an arrest warrant may constitutionally detain the occupants of the 
residence for the period of time necessary to safely effectuate the arrest.”  
Adams v. Springmeyer, 17 F.Supp.3d 478, 502 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (citing United 
States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 330 n.6 (1st Cir. 2011); Cherrington v. Skeeter, 
344 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788, 797, 
n.32 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also, e.g., Way v. State, 101 P.3d 203, 206-09 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 2004); Hannah, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d at 811-12; State v. Valdez, 69 P.3d 
1052, 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).  As aptly explained by one federal district 
court, such limited detentions are justified when balanced against the legitimate 
governmental interest in officer safety: 
[D]espite whatever precautions might be taken, it is inevitable that 
some potentially dangerous police activities will occur among 
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private citizens.  These private citizens, while wholly innocent 
bystanders, often may introduce additional variables at a time when 
the primary and legitimate goal of the police is to secure control of 
the situation.  Failure to gain complete control of the situation may 
endanger the success of the police operation, as well as the safety 
of the innocent bystanders and law enforcement officers.  Thus, 
police have a strong interest in securing the arrest scene, including 
if necessary the temporary detention of third persons who may be 
present. 
 
Croom v. Balkwill, 672 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (quoting 
Thompson v. City of Lawrence, 1994 WL 262598 at *10 (D. Kan. 1994)).  
Because police officers executing arrest warrants frequently encounter the same 
dangers faced by officers executing search warrants, this Court should hold, 
consistent with other jurisdictions that have considered the issue, that “police 
have the limited authority to briefly detain those on the scene, even wholly 
innocent bystanders, as they execute a search or arrest warrant.”  Cherrington, 
344 F.3d at 638 (citations omitted). 
Applying the above legal principles, and testing Williams’ initial detention 
against the “ultimate standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth 
Amendment,” Summers, 452 U.S. at 699-700, it is clear that the officers’ act of 
temporarily detaining Williams while they executed the arrest warrant for 
Bellenbrock was constitutionally reasonable.  Officers were executing the 
warrant, at night, at an apartment at which at least four individuals were present.  
(Tr., p.8, L.6 – p.12, L.4.)  When the officers approached the residence the 
subject of the warrant, who was “a known, wanted felon,” fled into the residence 
and then out the back door, making it necessary for officers to chase him.  (Tr., 
p.12, L.15 – p.13, L.23, p.20, Ls.23-24.)  The fact that the officers were 
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executing an arrest warrant instead of a search warrant did not make them any 
less susceptible to risks of danger associated with such confrontations.  Indeed, 
as Officer Thueson testified, when Bellenbrock fled to avoid arrest the officers 
did not know “if he would reenter the residence” to “access weapons,” nor did 
they know who the other three individuals at the apartment were, whether they 
were armed, or whether, if the officers left them, they would attempt to assist 
Bellenbrock in avoiding capture.  (Tr., p.20, L.16 – p.21, L.6.)  In light of risks 
they faced and their legitimate interest in safely and expeditiously executing the 
arrest warrant, there can be little doubt that the officers were justified in 
“excercis[ing] unquestioned command of the situation,” Summers, 452 U.S. at 
702-03, including by briefly detaining Williams and the other individuals on scene 
“for the period of time necessary to safely effectuate the arrest,” Adams, 17 
F.Supp.3d at 502 (citations omitted).  Nor can it seriously be contended that 
Williams’ detention lasted any longer than reasonably necessary to effectuate 
this purpose.  The evidence shows that officers detained Williams for, “at most,” 
three or four minutes while other officers chased after Bellenbrock and placed 
him under arrest.  (Tr., p.15, Ls.12-19, p.16, L.23 – p.17, L.9.)  Although officers 
continued to detain Williams after that point, they did so not in relation to 
execution of the arrest warrant but because they developed suspicion that 
Williams was involved in criminal activity.  (Tr., p.43, L.6 – p.44, L.14; see also 
Sections D and E, infra.)  
Despite Williams’ assertions to the contrary, the governmental interests 
involved in this case clearly outweighed the brief restraint on his liberty that 
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occurred while officers executed the arrest warrant.  Because the officers were 
justified in detaining Williams for the time it took to execute the arrest warrant, 
the district court correctly concluded that Williams’ initial detention was 
constitutionally reasonable. 
  
 2. Williams Has Failed To Show Officers Detained Him Longer Than  
  Reasonably Necessary To Investigate Whether He Had Harbored  
  A Fugitive 
 
 As an alternative to its argument that Williams’ initial detention was 
justified by officer safety concerns during the execution of the arrest warrant, the 
state also argued below that officers were justified in detaining Williams to 
investigate whether he had harbored a fugitive.  (R., p.97; see also Tr., p.21, 
Ls.7-12 (Officer Thueson testifying “the crime of harboring a fugitive … needed 
to be investigated”).)  At the suppression hearing, Williams’ trial counsel 
conceded “it was permissible for [officers] to identify Mr. Williams to determine 
whether or not he was involved in harboring Mr. Bellenbrock and to conduct an 
investigation from there.”  (Tr., p.37, Ls.17-21.)  The district court did not address 
this issue as a basis for its ruling.  This Court may nevertheless uphold the 
legality of Williams’ detention on this alternative basis because Williams 
conceded any detention for the purpose of determining whether he had harbored 
a fugitive was lawful at its inception and, contrary to his arguments on appeal 
(see Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13), officers did not detain him for longer than 
necessary to effectuate that lawful purpose.  See, e.g., State v. Avelar, 129 
Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997) (where lower court reaches correct 
result by different theory, appellate court will affirm on correct theory).  
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It is well-settled that a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains 
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 30-31 (1968).  “An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon 
specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has 
been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.”  State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 
980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).  An investigative detention 
must not only be justified at its inception, but must also be conducted in a 
manner that is reasonably related in scope and duration to the circumstances 
which justified the interference in the first place.  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
499-500 (1983); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 
2004).  “There is no rigid time limit for determining when a detention has lasted 
longer than necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the detention 
and the law enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the 
stop.”  State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 
2008). 
 Application of the above legal principles to the facts established at the 
suppression hearing shows officers did not detain Williams for longer than 
necessary to determine whether he had harbored a fugitive.  A person harbors a 
fugitive if, knowing that a felony has been committed, he “harbor[s] and protect[s] 
a person who committed such felony or who has been charged with or convicted 
thereof.”  I.C. § 18-205(2).  Williams posits that, to confirm or dispel any 
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suspicion that he and the other individuals present at the apartment were 
harboring a fugitive, officers only needed to ask them about their relationship to 
Bellenbrock – a task that, according to Williams, “would have taken seconds – 
not minutes – to accomplish.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.12.)  Williams’ argument 
ignores the evidence.  While it is true that two officers detained Williams and his 
companions for three or four minutes while Officer Thueson and a fourth officer 
arrested Bellenbrock (see Tr., p.15, L.12 – p.17, L.9), that three- or four-minute 
detention was not unreasonable considering the information the officers needed 
to gather and the totality of the circumstances with which the officers were 
confronted.  To determine whether any or all of the individuals at the apartment 
were guilty of harboring a fugitive, the two officers would have had to talk to all 
three individuals, ascertain their identities and respective connections to 
Bellenbrock, and determine if any or all of them had “harbor[ed] and protect[ed]” 
Bellenbrock, knowing he had committed a felony.  That officers were unable to 
accomplish these tasks in “seconds,” rather than in the three or four minutes 
they detained Williams before developing probable cause that Williams was 
guilty of frequenting, is not unreasonable.  The evidence shows the officers were 
outnumbered and were still in the process of identifying Williams and his two 
companions at the conclusion of that three- or four-minute period.  (Tr., p.14, 
Ls.3-13, p.15, L.12 – p.16, L.12, p.16, L.23 – p.17, L.9.) 
 There is certainly nothing inherently unreasonable about two officers 
taking three or four minutes to investigate whether any one of the three 
individuals had harbored a fugitive.  Nor is there any evidence in the record to 
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suggest that the officers purposefully delayed their investigation beyond the time 
necessary to effectuate its purpose.  Because the evidence shows the detention 
was reasonable both at its inception and in its scope and duration, the district 
court’s ruling that the detention was constitutionally reasonable may be affirmed 
on this alternative basis. 
 
D. Williams Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination 
That Police Had Probable Cause To Arrest Him For Frequenting 
 
 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.  
“A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”  State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 
479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).)  A search incident to arrest is a well-
established exception to the warrant requirement and, as such, does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); 
Kerley, 134 Idaho at 874, 11 P.3d at 493.  “For an arrest to be considered lawful, 
it must be based on probable cause” to believe the arrestee has committed a 
crime.  State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816, 203 P.3d 1203, 1215 (2009) 
(citations omitted). 
 Determining the existence of probable cause is “a practical, common-
sense decision” whether, given all the circumstances, there is “a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.”  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 238 (1983).  Probable cause does not require an actual showing of criminal 
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activity, but only the “probability or substantial chance” of such activity.  Id. at 
244-45 n.13.  A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is 
involved is all that is required.  Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983); United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).  The facts known to the officers must 
be judged in accordance with “the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”  
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
 Application of the law to the facts established at the suppression hearing 
supports the district court’s determination that officers had probable cause to 
arrest Williams for frequenting.  Under Idaho Code § 37-2732(d), a person is 
guilty of frequenting if he is “present at or on premises of any place where he 
knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or cultivated, or are 
being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, administration, use, or to be 
given away.”  It is clear from the evidence that Williams was present at an 
apartment where marijuana was being held for distribution, delivery, or use.  
Immediately upon returning to the front of the apartment after arresting 
Bellenbrock, Officer Thueson smelled a strong odor of raw marijuana emanating 
from the apartment, and the homeowner admitted there was marijuana and 
paraphernalia inside the residence.  (Tr., p.16, Ls.13-22, p.17, Ls.10-17, p.27, 
L.25 – p.28, L.7, p.29, L.21 – p.30, L.10.)  The only question is whether police 
had probable cause to believe Williams knew that marijuana was being held for 
distribution, delivery or use at the residence.  Evidence that Williams was present 
for at least 30 minutes in an apartment that emitted a strong odor of raw 
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marijuana and in which the homeowner admitted there was actually marijuana 
and paraphernalia (see Tr., p.18, Ls.4-11) was sufficient evidence from which 
the officers could reasonably infer that Williams was aware of the drug activities 
around him.   
 Williams argues otherwise, contending that to meet its burden of 
establishing officers had probable cause to arrest Williams for frequenting, the 
state was required to present evidence showing that Williams actually knew 
there was marijuana in the apartment.  (Appellant’s brief, p.14.)  Williams’ 
argument is unavailing because it is contrary to applicable precedent.  Probable 
cause does not require an actual showing of criminal activity, but only a showing 
that the information possessed by officers “would lead a person of ordinary care 
and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime 
has been committed by the arrestee.”  State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, 140, 
206 P.3d 501, 504 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Gates, 462 U.S. 
at 244-45 n.3 (probable cause does not require actual showing of criminal 
activity, but only the “probability or substantial chance” of such activity).    
 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), is instructive.  In Pringle, police 
stopped a car with three people in it.  Id. at 368.  They searched the car after 
obtaining consent from the driver and found a large amount of cash in a roll in 
the glove compartment and baggies of cocaine tucked behind the folded-up 
armrest in the back seat.  Id.  After all three men in the car denied knowledge of 
the drugs and cash, officers arrested all three.  Id. at 368-69.  Pringle, the front-
seat passenger, later admitted that the drugs and cash were his.  Id.  After being 
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convicted, Pringle appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, 
asserting officers lacked probable cause to arrest him.  Id. at 369.  The Maryland 
Court of Appeals agreed and held that, “absent specific facts tending to show 
Pringle’s knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, the mere finding of 
cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was a front seat passenger in a car 
being driven by its owner is insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest 
for possession.”  Id. at 369 (internal quotes and brackets omitted).  However, this 
analysis was unanimously rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States.  
Id. at 370-74.   
The Supreme Court reiterated that probable cause deals with 
“probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances” and consists of a 
“reasonable ground for belief of guilt” that is “particularized with respect to the 
person to be searched or seized.”  Id. at 371 (internal quotes omitted).  “Finely 
tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a 
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the 
probable-cause decision.”  Id. (internal quotes and brackets omitted).  It 
reasoned that the presence of cocaine and a significant amount of cash in the 
car where it was accessible to all three occupants, in combination with the three 
occupants having provided no information as to ownership of the cash or 
cocaine, created “an entirely reasonable inference … that any or all three of the 
occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the 
cocaine.”  Id. at 373. 
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If presence in the car under the facts of Pringle was sufficient to establish 
probable cause to believe Pringle had both knowledge and dominion and control 
over the cocaine, Williams’ presence in the apartment under the facts of this 
case is sufficient to establish only knowledge.  Again, before they arrested 
Williams, officers had evidence that Williams was present for at least 30 minutes 
in an apartment in which there was an overwhelming odor of raw marijuana and 
in which the homeowner admitted marijuana and drug paraphernalia were 
actually present.  (Tr., p.18, Ls.4-11.)  Although the evidence that Williams knew 
there was marijuana in the apartment may have been less than that required for 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance, it  was certainly a 
reasonable inference for officers to conclude that persons present in the 
apartment for a prolonged time would have knowledge of the marijuana that was 
present and that officers smelled immediately upon approaching the front door.   
 The police reasonably inferred Williams’ knowledge of the presence of 
drugs from his extended presence in an apartment that smelled strongly of raw 
marijuana. The police did not have to assume that Williams was oblivious to the 
drug activity around him.  Williams’ request that this Court do so is contrary to 
the applicable legal standards and fails to show error by the trial court.  Because 
officers had probable cause to arrest Williams for frequenting, the subsequent 
search of his person was a valid search incident to that arrest.  Williams has 




E. Even If Officers Lacked Probable Cause To Arrest Williams For 
 Frequenting, Suppression Is Not Warranted Because, By Running From 
 Police, Williams Committed A New And Independent Crime That Justified 
 His Arrest And The Search That Followed 
 
 For the reasons set forth in Section D, supra, officers had probable cause 
to arrest Williams for frequenting.  However, even assuming they did not, 
suppression is not required.  Officer Thueson discovered the evidence Williams 
seeks to have suppressed only after Williams ran from the scene of his 
detention.  (Tr., p.18, L.12 – p.20, L.15.)  Because, for the reasons that follow, 
Williams’ act of running constituted a new and independent crime for which there 
existed probable cause to arrest, the subsequent search was a valid search 
incident to arrest. 
 As previously discussed, “a search conducted incident to a lawful arrest” 
is an exception to the warrant requirement and “permits officers to search 
individuals who have been lawfully arrested.”  State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 
815-16, 203 P.3d 1203, 1214-15 (2009) (citations omitted).  An arrest is lawful if 
it is based on probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime.  Id. 
at 816, 203 P.3d at 1215 (citations omitted).  That is, “the facts and 
circumstances known to the officer” must be such as to “warrant a prudent man 
in believing that the offense has been [or is being] committed.”  Id. (internal 
quotations and citations omitted, brackets in original).   
 In this case, even assuming officers lacked probable cause to arrest 
Williams for frequenting, the search that yielded the evidence in this case was a 
valid search incident to arrest because, at the time Officer Thueson conducted 
the search, he had probable cause to arrest Williams for resisting and 
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obstructing an officer, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-705.  As explained by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Bishop, that code section “makes it a crime to ‘willfully 
resist[], delay[] or obstruct[] any public officer, in the discharge, or attempt to 
discharge, … any duty of his office.’”  Bishop, 146 Idaho at 817, 203 P.3d at 
1216 (quoting I.C. § 18-705) (brackets and ellipses in original).  The Court has 
interpreted the term “duty,” as it is used in the statute, to mean “only those lawful 
and authorized acts of a public officer.”  Id. (internal quotations, citation and 
footnote omitted).  Thus, whether Williams’ arrest for resisting and obstructing 
was lawful depends on whether, by running away, Williams was obstructing 
officers in the performance of some lawful duty.  Correct application of the law to 
the facts established at the suppression hearing shows that he was. 
 At the time Williams fled, it appears that officers had not yet confirmed or 
dispelled what Williams’ counsel conceded below was a reasonable suspicion 
that Williams may have been harboring a fugitive.  (See Tr., p.37, Ls.17-21.)  
Moreover, for the reasons already set forth in Section D, supra, and incorporated 
here by reference, the facts available to the officers gave rise, at the very least, 
to a reasonable suspicion that Williams had committed the crime of frequenting.  
See State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998) (defendant’s 
presence at house suspected of drug activity gave rise to a reasonable inference 
that defendant was involved in the illegal activity).  Even assuming the facts 
available to the officers were not sufficient to justify Williams’ arrest for 
frequenting, Williams would still have been subject to a lawful investigatory 
detention from which he was not free to run away.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
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1, 30-31 (investigatory detention justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity is underway).  Because Williams was lawfully detained at least upon 
reasonable suspicion that he had engaged in criminal activity, his act of running 
from the detention actually obstructed the officers in the performance of their 
official, lawful duties.  The officers were thus justified in arresting Williams for 
resisting and in searching him incident to that arrest.  Williams has failed to show 
any error in the denial of his motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the 
denial of Williams’ motion to suppress. 
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